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THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES 
 OF 










 Tax avoidance by multinationals as well as the creative 
use of loopholes, has long been part of the global tax system.1 
However, after the Great Recession (2007 to 2009), many 
national governments faced extremely tight budgets and   
extraordinarily high debt burdens2; therefore, there was huge 
political pressure in the United States (U.S.) and Europe to 
require large profitable multinationals such as Google, Apple 
and Starbucks to pay their “fair share of taxes.”3 
 
 In response to the pressure, in 2013 the finance 
ministers of the world’s largest nations, known as the G20, 
initiated the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) 
Project, also referred to as “The Global Tax Reset.”4 BEPS 
refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and 
mismatches in tax laws to artificially shift profits to low or no-
tax regions where there is little or no economic activity.5 The
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) tax experts at the BEPS Project were told to develop 
principles to “ensure that profits are taxed where economic 
activities generating the profits are performed and where value 
is created.”6 They were also told to complete their work on an 
accelerated schedule by the end of 2015.7  
 
While there is evidence that international tax avoidance 
and evasion8 may lead to a loss of billions in tax revenue, 
which can adversely affect national economies,9 it is not clear 
whether BEPS or the Global Tax Reset will alleviate or 
exacerbate the problem. This paper will examine the history 
and consequences of international tax avoidance as well as 




HISTORY OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
 The idea of international tax avoidance probably started 
in the U.S. and the British Empire.10 The “offshore” 
phenomenon probably began in the U.S. when states such as 
Delaware and New Jersey realized they could lure businesses 
from more prosperous states by offering tax benefits on the 
condition that those businesses register in their states.11 Then, 
the first cases of international tax avoidance occurred in the 
British Empire in the early 1900s when wealthy individuals 
started to use offshore trusts in places like the British Channel 
Islands to exploit the British principle of separation of tax 
residence and domicile.12 
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 By the 1920s, the League of Nations helped design a 
“Draft Model on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion.”13 After 
that, the United Nations, and more recently, the OECD have 
taken the lead in establishing model tax treaties and guidelines 
that individual nations could adopt in their entirety or modify 
in accordance with their own needs.14 
 
 In the 1930s, Switzerland offered “internationally 
mobile people” residency, only requiring them to pay a fixed, 
undisclosed amount of tax – not varying with income – each 
year. Switzerland also contributed to international tax 
avoidance with the use of banking secrecy, developed at the 
time of the French Revolution but enshrined in Swiss law in 
the 1930s.15 The Swiss felt that these measures gave them an 
advantage as a small, land-locked nation in a hostile European 
environment.16 
 
 At the current time, there are 72 tax havens around the 
world with almost half of them being British territories, 
dependencies or Commonwealth members.17 It appears that the 
tax avoidance industry always seems to be outpacing the 
governments. Elected governments take years to develop tax 
laws but the accounting and law firms always seem to 
undermine them within months of a public official’s budget 
speech.18 Many accounting and law firms advise governments 
on legislative design and enforcement, fueling the suspicion 
that the tax avoidance industry and national governments are 
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COSTS OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
 Taxes play a critical role in the development of an 
equitable society.20 Progressive forms of taxation – income, 
profit or capital-gains taxes – are the main ways in which 
wealth is redistributed.21 Taxes are also a cornerstone of 
democracy, giving individuals and business a financial stake in 
society.22  
 Estimating how much tax avoidance and evasion cost 
the U.S. Treasury is difficult.23 Some estimate it as being about 
$50 billion a year.24 Former IRS Commissioner Rossotti says 
the uncollected tax gap could be in the range of $250 to $300 
billion per year, which is the equivalent of a 15 percent surtax 
on the honest taxpayer.25 
 
 In the United Kingdom, it is estimated that there is an 
annual loss of $170 billion in avoided taxes.26 Even in a 
relatively wealthy nation, this sum is exorbitant when public 
funds are scarce and people are becoming more reluctant to see 
increased government spending on various programs.27 
 
 Tax avoidance adversely affects poor nations the 
most.28 As an example, Bolivia is sitting on the gas and oil 
reserves worth billions, yet it is the poorest nation in South 
America. The contradiction between Bolivia’s grinding poverty 
and the fact that companies such as British Gas and BP pay 
relatively little tax for extracting Bolivia’s valuable resources 
has not been lost on the Bolivian people: protests have toppled 
two governments in two years.29 While Bolivia has enormous 
wealth, millions of Bolivians live in horrible poverty. In El 
Alto, a quarter of the population have no running water and 
diseases such as dysentery and diarrhea are rampant.30 
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 Multinational companies such as British Gas and BP 
can afford to pay higher taxes and still achieve high profits – 
consider the case of Norway.31 In the 1950s, Norway was one 
of the poorest nations in Europe. By the 1960s, substantial oil 
and gas deposits were discovered in the Norwegian continental 
shelf.32 The Norwegian government was able to improve the 
nation’s financial position through an efficient tax system. The 
average government take for a standard 100-million-barrel is 
75 percent.33 This money is placed into the Norwegian 
Government Petroleum Fund, which subsidizes the welfare 
state, both now and in the future, after the reserves run out.34 
 
 Much of U.S. and European development policy in 
Bolivia focused on aid and debt relief. But raising the tax on 
extracting Bolivian gas would provide an enormous 
development fund, similar to the one Norway maintains, 
without costing the taxpayers a penny.35 The building of water 
mains in Bolivia could be funded several times over.36 
 
 Furthermore, the U.S. provides debt relief of $44 
million a year to Bolivia and Bolivia owes the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund over $2 billion.37 The 
estimated total value of Bolivia’s gas reserves is $250 billion. 
By imposing a larger tax on the extraction of its gas reserves, 
Bolivia could pull itself out of poverty with no cost to the U.S. 
and European taxpayers.38 
 
 Tax avoidance by multinational corporations are in a 
unique position to use tax havens to avoid large amounts of tax 
payments. Vast sums of money are put beyond the reach of tax 
authorities.39 The world’s wealthiest individuals hold $11.5 
trillion offshore. If the earnings of $11.5 trillion were taxed at a 
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rate of 30 percent, it would raise an annual sum of $255 billion, 




BEPS – THE GLOBAL TAX RESET 
 
 Due to rising economic and political pressures, 
politicians from Europe and the U.S. strongly supported the 
accelerated BEPS Project.41 The Obama Administration signed 
onto the BEPS Project in the expectation that it would 
strengthen the U.S. tax base and enable the federal government 
to hold onto more corporate tax revenues.42 
 
 The BEPS Project aims to prevent base erosion and 
profit shifting by having taxes paid in the jurisdiction where 
profits are generated and value is created (i.e., substance).43 
The BEPS Action Plan, published in 2013, has implemented 
the following 15 action plans44: 
 
1. Address the tax challenges of the digital economy 
2. Neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements 
3. Strengthen the controlled foreign companies (CFC) 
rules 
4. Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other 
financial payments 
5. Counter harmful tax practices more effectively taking 
into account transparency and substance 
6. Prevent treaty abuse 
7. Prevent the artificial avoidance of permanent 
establishment (PE) status 
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8. Assure that that transfer pricing outcomes are in line 
with value creation: intangibles 
9. Assure that that transfer pricing outcomes are in line 
with value creation: risks/capital 
10. Assure that that transfer pricing outcomes are in line 
with value creation: other high risk transactions 
11. Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on 
BEPS and the action to address it 
12. Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax 
planning arrangements 
13. Re-examine transfer pricing documentation 
14. Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective 
15. Develop a multilateral instrument 
 
While the BEPS Project was initiated by the G20 nations, it 
effectively also encompassed the other OECD Member States 
from the beginning.45 As the project progressed, engagement in 
discussions was extended to other large, non-OECD nations 
and representatives from developing nations. The OECD 
published over 1600 pages in final reports with regard to all 15 
BEPS Action items in October 2015.46 The United Nations, 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and OECD are all 
developing toolkits to assist “low-income nations” in 
implementing the outcomes of the BEPS Project.47 
 
 One of the cornerstones of the BEPS Project is Action 
13 or Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR).48 In general, 
CbCR is required in the nation where the ultimate parent 
company has its tax residence. If this nation has not 
implemented CbCR, multinational enterprises (MNE) may be 
required to file in the nations where they conduct business. 
Specifically, Action 13 recommendations require MNEs with 
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global turnover of 750 million euros ($835,845,000) or more in 
the preceding fiscal year to submit a CbCR report each year in 
every jurisdiction in which they conduct business.49 This report 
would contain financial information with regard to each nation 
where the MNE operates, such as types of activities conducted, 
local turnover, taxes paid, assets and number of employees. 
The primary goal of Action 13 is to align profits with value 
creation and substance.50  
 
 On June 28, 2016, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
and the Treasury issued final country-by-country regulations 
that will apply to U.S persons that are the ultimate parent 
entities of a MNE that has annual revenue for the preceding 
annual accounting period of $850,000,000 or more.51 The 
regulations will apply to reporting periods that begin on or after 




PROBLEMS WITH BEPS 
 
 While the purpose of BEPS may be to reduce the most 
egregious forms of tax planning,53 many believe that it may 
only exacerbate the problems of international tax avoidance.54 
 
 The result of the new requirements will be to impose 
significant new burdens on MNEs because of the 
administrative difficulties involved in preparing the BEPS 
templates and dealing with audit activity initiated by nations 
due to information reported on them.55 MNEs will also face the 
administrative requirement of reconciling public financial 
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statements, legal entity books, local tax returns, and the 
templates.56  
 
An additional concern with CbCR reporting is 
confidentiality – many MNEs and practitioners believe that at 
least some taxing jurisdictions will make the information 
reported publicly available or that the information will be 
leaked to the public57 For the first time, taxing officials 
throughout the world will be able to determine how MNEs 
allocate their income and tax payments to a specific nation and 
other nations too. The BEPS template will serve as a tool for 
taxing officials to identify and select companies to be audited.58 
These audits can be used as political leverage against MNEs 
who don’t wish to follow certain objectionable practices in a 
particular jurisdiction.59 
 
 This problem can be solved to some extent by requiring 
nations to establish legal protections to preserve the 
confidentiality of the CbCR reporting. Also, there could be a 
legal requirement that the BEPS template will only be used to 
assess potential high-level BEPS-related risks.60 
 
 While the administrative burdens required by BEPS are 
a problem, the biggest problem with BEPS is that tax experts 
and even the OECD itself agree that the principles on which 
the current international tax system was designed is based on 
what the world and companies looked like around a 100 years 
ago.61 Today, more than a third of all international trade is 
intra-company trade – different subsidiaries with an MNE 
buying goods and services from each other. This allows money 
to be easily shifted around with big companies, often using 
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subsidiaries in tax havens, so as to avoid paying taxes as much 
as possible.62 
 
 Many developing nations see MNEs move money out 
of their jurisdictions because the current international tax 
regime makes it perfectly legal to do so.63 A 2015 study 
released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development estimates that companies owned from conduit 
companies and tax havens avoid paying $100 billion in taxes 
each year by shifting profits out of developing nations.64 
 Some of the challenges faced by developing nations, 
such as transfer mispricing, excessive interest payments on 
intracompany loans and hybrid mismatches (exploitation of 
differences between nations’ tax laws) are addressed by BEPS. 
However, the recommendations are (1) resource-intensive (e.g., 
the transfer pricing recommendations); (2) filled with 
exemptions that weaken the effectiveness (e.g., intra-company 
loans); and (3) not designed with developing nations in mind 
(e.g., minor changes suggested to anti-tax haven legislation).65 
All of this means that it will be difficult for poor nations to 
implement the BEPS recommendations66 and even if they do, 
they probably won’t collect that much more tax revenue as a 
result.67 
 
 One problem that BEPS does not address is tax 
competition. While BEPS may broaden the tax base in some 
nations, it doesn’t address the race to the bottom for low 
corporate income tax rates and big tax giveaways though larger 
tax exemptions.68 In fact, BEPS could create even more 
competition as nations that can no longer offer the kinds of 
schemes targeted by BEPS will look for other ways to cut their 
tax rates.69 
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 If the tax problems of developing nations are to be 
addressed, then other solutions are needed. These include: (1) 
allowing more representation of developing nations on 
international tax rules; (2) allowing unilateral developing 
nation actions (e.g., developing national and regional 
approaches as opposed to the preferred international 
approaches); and (3) developing national frameworks for how 
to negotiate tax treaties to ensure that no taxing rights are 
unfairly handed away.70 
 
RECENT INTERNATIONAL TAX REPERCUSSIONS 
 
 In recent years, multinational officials have attempted 
to stamp out sweetheart tax deals that nations strike with global 
companies, including U.S. tech giants.71 Taxation is one of the 
many issues that have placed U.S. tech companies at odds with 
European officials and a recent notable example of this would 
be the case of Apple Inc. (“Apple”).72 
 
 In August of 2016, the European Commission ruled that 
Apple has received illegal state aid through its advanced 
pricing agreements with Ireland.73 Apple and Ireland believe 
the advanced pricing agreements conform to Irish and 
European Union law and the Irish government has agreed to 
appeal the ruling.74 
 
 According to the European Commission ruling, the 
selective tax treatment of Apple in Ireland is illegal under 
European Union state aid rules because it gives Apple a 
significant advantage over other businesses that are subject to 
the same national tax laws.75 Consequently, the ruling requires 
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Ireland to recover the unpaid taxes in Ireland from Apple for 
years 2003 to 2014 of up to $14 billion, plus interest.76 
  
 Many see the Apple ruling as an example of the global 
trend to emphasize substance.77 Action 5 of the BEPS Final 
Reports recommends that taxing jurisdictions limit preferential 
intellectual property regimes to companies that can 
demonstrate a certain level of substance in the nation.78 In that 
regard, the European Commission’s ruling against Ireland and 
Apple focus on the lack of substance with regard to the “main 
office” allocation of profits.79 
 The U.S. Treasury (“the Treasury”) takes a different 
view on the Apple ruling. The Treasury has stated: (1) that the 
European Commission’s actions undermine U.S. efforts in 
developing transfer pricing norms and implementing the BEPS 
project; and (2) call into question the ability of Member States 
to honor their bilateral tax treaties with the U.S.80 Furthermore, 
the Treasury has expressed the concern that adopting new 
enforcement regimes with retroactive effect will: (1) hinder 
companies’ ability to assess risks and plans for the future; and 
(2) sets an unwelcome precedent for tax authorities around the 
world to take similar retroactive actions that could adversely 
affect both U.S. and European Union companies.81 
 
 In light of these concerns, many believe that the 
European Commission’s ruling may prompt non-European 
Union nations to change their taxing regimes in order to lure 
companies like Apple and others.82 For example, the United 
Kingdom could cut corporate tax rates, and make other tax 
changes, in order to attract major multinational companies. If 
this occurs, this would validate the Treasury’s concerns as 
various jurisdictions may abandon BEPS in favor of luring 
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 There is no question that international tax avoidance is 
a huge problem and many needy people in developed and 
developing nations are suffering as a result of the tax revenue 
lost due to tax avoidance schemes. The need to address 
international tax avoidance is what initiated BEPS – The 
Global Tax Reset. 
 
 While BEPS does address some of the issues of 
international tax avoidance; overall, it may be creating more 
administrative burdens without addressing the core issues of 
international tax avoidance. 
 
 In order to more effectively solve the problems incurred 
by international tax avoidance, developing nations need to be 
include on a larger scale in the formulation of international tax 
rules and be allowed to take more unilateral actions based on 
their current resources and situations. It appears that solutions 
based on international frameworks never seem to be effective; 
therefore, allowing more national and regional approaches 
could lead to a more concise and appropriate solution to the 
unique tax issues that characterize each nation. The recent 
European Commission ruling in the case of Apple and Ireland 
indicates that the European Union may be adopting a more 
regional approach to addressing international tax issues, 
thereby undermining BEPS for the time being.  
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